A group of 49 undergraduate business school and 46 undergraduate psychology students and a group of 95 employees at different companies responded to a number of case-based organizational allocation tasks. Imagining themselves as employees in the organizations described, participants chose the fairest and the best out of four allocations in either a collectively or an individually framed organizational culture. Furthermore, social comparisons between different groups in the organizations were salient for half of the participants. It was predicted that evaluations on the fairness dimension, social comparison, and a collectively oriented organizational culture would increase choices of an equal allocation. It was also predicted that evaluations on the preference dimension, non-social comparison, and an individually oriented organizational culture would i ncrease choices of non-equality distributions (i.e., maximization, pro-self, or pro-other). Results supported all predictions except those for organizational culture.
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When people allocate resources, they often consider equal distributions to be fairest and, therefore, choose to split equally when possible (e.g., Allison & Messick, 1990) . Many times people also choose to allocate resources equally even when inputs are not equal (Messick & Schell, 1992) . Splitting resources equally is thus clearly a prominent mean to allocate. Moreover, people sometimes prefer an equal distribution even though an unequal distribution would be more beneficial to all (Eek & Gärling, 2002) . Therefore, equality sometimes qualifies as the rational choice-theorist's nightmare (see Selart & Eek, 1999 , for a review). Equality as a distributive principle is this article's protagonist. We will demonstrate that choices of different distributive principles as fair allocation principles differ quite dramatically from choices of preferred allocation principles.
Allocation principles
Equality, the distributive principle prescribing equal shares to all members, has been studied thoroughly, and this research has lead to some general ideas: equality is likely to be the dominating allocation principle when people have social harmony as the goal of their interaction (Deutsch, 1975) . As a solution to distributive problems, equality stresses the cooperative aspects of a relationship, in opposition to the principle of equity (proportionality), which stresses competitive aspects. Equality-oriented behavior communicates cooperative intentions among status-equals with common interests, while equity-oriented behavior communicates competitiveness among persons stratified in a status hierarchy (Sampson, 1975) . It has been argued that it may be this particular value, signaling equal status among people, that often turns equality to the most preferred allocation principle. Thus, to share equally is conflict-avoiding since it does not make explicit or evaluates differences in strengths or legitimacy of claims (Diekman, Samuels, Ross, & Bazerman, 1997) . Furthermore, equality may be an appealing solution in that it is quite easily agreed upon since deviations from equality often seem to produce greater displeasure in participants who achieve less than it produces pleasure in participants who achieve more. It may be that the equality principle allows all partic ipants to achieve their minimally acceptable outcomes (Messick & Sentis, 1985) .
Eq uality has additional advantages. For instance, it is often a cognitively simple strategy, easily understood by everyone, and quickly implemented (Messick & Schell, 1992) . Here, equality is known as the "equality heuristic", one of many decision heuristics used in people's everyday life. Decision heuristics have the characteristics of not being r esults of careful deliberations, they are merely rule-of-thumbs (Allison & Messick, 1990 ). For instance, in an influential study by Harris and Joyce (1980) participants were asked to allocate a resource pool between members who had contributed in the creation of the pool. No matter if the pool had been equally or unequally created, participants distributed it according to equality. Thus, in one condition final profits were eventually unequally allocated.
Finally, it has been argued that equality serves as an "anchor" that defines the minimum people will take when dividing a resource. People only deviate from such anchors when there are certain conditions present, such as ambiguity about division criteria, ambiguity about others' contributions, uncertainty about other participants' willingness to cooperate, or a resource pool difficult to divide equally (Allison & Messick, 1990; Messick, 1995; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) . It has also been demonstrated that a choice situation implicating the resolution of a conflict between an No. 1:34,3 evoked norm of dividing equally -the equality principle -and other appropriate allocations, for instance self-rewarding ones, involves some typ ical factors. Such factors may be apparent ones, like individual differences between participants, and less apparent ones, like divisibility or magnitude of the resource. The latter factors, that may seem trivial, can sometimes result in major changes, or even reversal of outcomes (Allison & Messick, 1990; Selart & Eek, 2002) . Moreover, in a recent experiment (Ohtsubo & Kameda, 1998 ) the equality heuristic had a smaller anchoring effect on bargaining outcomes in cost-sharing than in benefit-sharing. Thus, deviations in the bargaining outcomes from equal splitting of the overall amount were larger in costsharing than in benefit-sharing. Thus, as Messick and Schell (1992) propose, equality seems to provide a useful starting point in resource allocation tasks and in negotiations from which adjustments can be made.
Despite the many advantages of the equality principle, it is still only one allocation principle among others. When there are other goals of interactions than social harmony, other principles may serve better. Sampson (1975) argued that there are two major solutions to the distributive problem in economic and other spheres of life, the equity solution and the equality solution, and that they vary considerably in their understanding of the conditions appropriate to create harmony, cohesion, and justice. Deutsch (1975) offered a similar categorization of rules determining fair allocations, equity, equality, and need, and suggested that each of the principles favors a certain goal of a relationship (Deutsch, 1975) . Where economic productivity is a primary goal, equity will be applied, where enjoyable social relations is most important, equality will be applied, and where personal welfare is the main value, the need principle will be applied. According to the principle of equity, a resource is allocated to members in proportion to their i nputs, for example contributions and achievements (Walster & Walster, 1975) . The principle of proportionality can be seen as a regulative norm in many forms of relationships, business-oriented as well as in loving ones, and equity norms are learned because of moral and economic reasons. The need principle, finally, prescribes that resources ought to be allocated in proportion to basic needs securing personal well-being (Deutsch, 1975) . Mannix, Neale, and Northcraft (1995) reviewed research on effects of organizational culture on outcome evaluations. They define organizational culture as "the values and expectations which organizational members come to share, and as a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by an organization's members" (p. 277). Mannix et al. concluded that organizational cultures powerfully shape behavior and perceptions in allocation situations, and that an established distribution norm is likely to reduce conflicts in such situations. In their study, Deutsch's notion of relationship goals was generalized to the level of organizational culture. Thus, goals or values are found in organizations and manifested in cultures and in norms imposed by these cultures. Therefore, they argued, it should be expected that organizational cultures, in the same way as relatio nship goals, determine to what extent different allocation principles are perceived as fair. The results of their experiment generally supported the hypothesized links between organizational culture and applications of different allocation principles.
Factors influencing evaluations of outcomes
The study by Mannix et al. (1995) is one of very few who explicitly test the hypothesized links between distrib ution goals and allocation principles proposed by No. 1:34,4 Deutsch (1975) . Deutsch noted that different goals may conflict with one another. An example of this is the frequent problem that equality may not maximize the common good. Sometimes, another principle than equality is a collectively better choice in that all would receive more by its implementation. In the present study, participants in organizational settings chose between equality and other allocation principles, for instance, an allocation which compared to equality was more beneficial to all parties. One aim of this study is to investigate how organizational culture affects the choices of the different allocation principles.
In research on outcome evaluations there has been a discussion about judgment dimensions (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; van den Bos et al., 1998 ). An evaluator may judge an outcome in terms of fairness, but he or she may also judge it in terms of preference. It has been argued that these evaluation dimensions (fairness vs. preference) can be equated because some research has shown that they often converge in people's minds. It must be said, though, that the object of this debate is not whether the two concepts are identical or not -it is most likely agreed upon that they are not -but whether or not it is legitimate to treat them as identical, due to a great conceptual overlap (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) . Outcome fairness refers to the legitimacy of the outcome in relation to the prevailing definition of justice, whereas outcome preference refers to the extent of material benefit in the outcome being judged. In the van den Bos et al. study (1998) it was demonstrated that fairness and preference judgments indeed differ. The egoistic joy of getting a relatively large share of a distribut ion counteracts in preference judgments, but not in fairness judgments, the distress coming from the perceived obliqueness in that distribution. In the study by Messick and Sentis (1979) it was demonstrated that participants' preferences significantly differed from their fairness judgments. In the present study, we deliberately separated the two dimensions of evaluations with the aim of investigating whether different allocation principles are chosen out of fairness or out of preference.
Many studies have demonstrated the biasing effects of self-interest in allocation tasks. For example, participants with relatively small inputs tend to consider equal distributions of shares as fair, while participants with relatively large inputs claim an equity-oriented distribution (Messick & Sentis, 1979; Messick & Sentis, 1983) . Several studies have explored both perceptual and cognitive biases that may cause people to express equity-oriented claims that other parties involved, as well as unbiased observers, experience as unfair and self-serving (Diekman et al., 1996 ; see also Roch, Lane, Samuelson, Allison, & Dent, 2000) . Ross and Sicoly (1979) suggested that selfserving biases may occur because people overestimate their own inputs, simply because they are more available to them cognitively. Further, Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) found in an experiment that rival participants in a simulated contract negotiation recalled significantly more facts supporting their own position than the other party's position -a self-serving bias in memory. Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, and Samuelson (1985) demonstrated that participants perceive themselves to act fairly more often than others do, and that behaviors ascribed to oneself are perceived as fairer than behaviors ascribed to others. In the study by Messick and Sentis (1979) , an egocentric bias was found in participants' fairness judgments. As compared to participants in a highresource position, participants in a low-resource position perceived equal outcomes as fairer. Similarly, a fair outcome to oneself was higher than a fair outcome to somebody else. These results suggest that there are differences between what people prefer and/or regard as fair when they themselves are involved as compared to when they are not.
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Thus, whether people base choices of an allocation principle on fairness or on preference might be related to whether or not they are involved in the allocation as receivers. Another aim of the present study is to explicitly compare choices of preference and choices of fairness.
Researchers in the area of outcome evaluations have also theorized in terms of reference points, since it for long time has been known that evaluations to a large extent depend on standards or referents (e.g., van den Bos et al., 1998) . Norms are evoked by the decision context and subsequently used as reference points in the evaluation process (Boles & Messick, 1995) . One important such reference point in the process of evaluating fairness of outcomes is social comparison. Equity theory, as a handy example, is based on the idea that other people's outcomes are important to a person who evaluates his or her own outcome. It has been shown that outcomes are judged as fairer and better when they are equal to, as opposed to different from, outcomes received by others (Messick & Sentis, 1983) . Van den Bos et al. (1998) claim the importance of drawing a distinction between social comparison and other reference points, such as, for instance, expectations, since social comparisons are more directly connected to fairness judgments, and this, in turn, may reveal a difference between evaluations of fairness and evaluations of preference. A third aim of the present study is to investigate the impact of social comparison on fairness and preference evaluations.
The present study
In the present study, participants imagined that they were members in a work group at a fictitious company where the managers planned to invest money for various employee-development schemes. Participants' task was to choose between different allocations of the money invested. For some groups of participants, the parties of the allocations were focused on social comparisons. For instance, participants allocated money between two different work groups. For other participant groups, social comparison was not present in the allocations. Instead, participants decided in their allocation choices how much money should be invested the present year and how much should be invested the following year. Our focus was to study under what circumstances participants preferred an equal allocation to other alternative allocations. Apart from an equality alternative, there were three other allocations to choose from; A maximization alternative that, unequally distributed, maximized the jointly invested money between either the two work groups or between the present and the following year; A pro-self alternative that maximized the money invested either in the own work group or in the present year; A pro-other alternative that maximized the money invested either in the other work group or in the following year.
In sum, the aims of the present study is to (i) investigate how organizational culture affects choices of allocation principles, (ii) investigate whether different allocation principles are chosen out of fairness or out of preference, and (iii) investigate the impact of social comparison on fairness and preference evaluations. We predict that participants will prefer the equality alternative when they are asked to choose the fairest distribution (H1a). As a distribution principle likely to be dominating when social harmony is the goal of an interaction (Deutsch, 1975) , as a principle communicating equal status and stressing cooperative aspects of relationships (Sampson, 1975) , as a conflict-avoiding principle (Diekman et al., 1997) , as a principle allowing all participants to achieve their minimally acceptable outcomes (Messick & Sentis, 1985) , No. 1:34, 6 and as a principle perhaps more functional in a social context than an outcome maximizing strategy (Baron, 1994) , equality can be expected to have a central position in people's definitions and intuitions of fair outcome allocations. Furthermore, since the equality principle is considered a cognitively simple strategy, easily understood, quickly implemented (Messick & Schell, 1992) , a decision heuristic, applied in a blind fashion (Allison & Messick, 1990; Harris & Joyce, 1980) , and having a function as an anchor in allocation tasks and negotiations (Allison & Messick, 1990; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) , equality can be expected to be applied without much deliberation. Taken together, research points to a function of equa lity as almost being an intuitive definition of fairness in allocations.
We further expect participants to prefer the maximization allocation when they are asked to choose the most preferred alternative (H1b). In contrast to a making a choice based on fairness, a request for a preference judgment does not evoke the heuristic use of equality. Therefore, participants will make more deliberate judgments, and opt for a maximization of outcomes. Thus, we hypothesize that there will be a shift from the equality alternative to the maximization alternative.
We further expect that a focus on social comparison in an allocation decision will lead to a higher frequency of equality choices (H2a). This can be expected based on research demonstrating that outcomes are frequently evaluated in the light of others' outcomes. Generally, outcomes are judged as fairer and more preferred when they are equal to, as opposed to different from, outcomes of comparison others (Messick & Sentis, 1983) . Since requests for fairness considerations make less sense in non-social comparison circumstances, we also expect an interaction between type of choice (i.e., best vs. fairest) and social comparison (i.e., presence vs. absence). In a non-social comparison situation, an increase in the frequency of other than equality alternative allocations is expected (H2b).
Finally, we expect that organizational culture will influence participants' preferenc es. We base this assumption on former studies arguing that organizational cultures powerfully shape behavior and perceptions in distribution situations (Mannix et al., 1995) . We predict that an individually oriented culture will lead to a higher frequency of other than equality choices (H3a) and that a collectively oriented culture will lead to a higher frequency of equality-choices (H3b). An individually oriented culture will i nduce more thinking of economic productivity, while a collectively oriented culture will breed considerations for the group's social aspects (Deutsch, 1975) .
Method

Participants
Ninety-five undergraduates (46 psychology undergraduates with a mean age of 27.2 years and 49 business school undergraduates with a mean age of 24.7 years) and 95 employees (mean age = 34.9 years) at different companies participated in the experiment. Among the psychology undergraduates, 22 were women and 24 were men. Among the business school undergraduates, 25 were women and 24 were men. Finally, among the employees, 46 were women and 49 were men. All u ndergraduates had completed at least two semesters of their educational programs.
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Materials
Through 12 pages in a questionnaire, each participant was asked to imagine that he or she was a member in a work group at a fictitious company. In order to increase the competence within the staff of the company, the managers planned to invest money for various employee-development schemes for the work groups at the company. The task for participants was to choose between four different allocations (A, B, C, or D) of such monetary investments. A b etween-subjects factor regarded the parties of these allocations. For one group of participants, received vs. e xpected own group, the allocations regarded how much money their own work group would receive the present year and how much money their own work group expected to receive the following year. An exa mple is:
Alternatives A, B, C, and D constitute the different allocations. A is the pro-self alternative, B is the pro-other alternative, C is the maximization alternative, and D is the equality alternative. For another group, received vs. expected unspecified group, the allocations regarded how much money an unspecified work group would receive the present year and how much money the unspecified work group expected to receive the following year. For a third group, known vs. unknown group, the allocations regarded how much money a known work group (where the participant once had worked) would receive the present year and how much money an unknown work group would receive the present year. Finally, for a fourth group, own vs. another group, the allocations regarded how much money their own work group would receive the present year and how much money another work group would receive the present year. Participants in the two former groups were not expected to do any social comparisons in their evaluations since the allocations (A-D) regarded how much money would be invested in one group of employees only. However, participants in the latter two groups were expected to make social comparisons in their judgments since the allocations (A-D) regarded how much money would be invested in two different groups.
For each task (i.e., each page in the questionnaire), half of the participants were first asked to indicate which allocation (A, B, C, or D) they perceived as the fairest one. Thereafter, they were asked to ind icate which allocation (A, B, C, or D) they perceived to be the best (most preferred) one. The other half of participants made these choices in the reverse order. All participants completed a total of 12 1 replication tasks which resulted in 24 choice responses for each participant.
Another between-subjects factor manipulated the organizational culture within the company. For half of the participants, the company was said to reward the employees strictly in relation to their performance. In this company, the typical employee worked hard individually to receive a higher wage (individually oriented). For the other half of participants, the company was said to reward the employees not only in relation to their performance, but also with regard to personal development and well-being. In this company, the typical employee cared for the colleagues and their interests (collectively oriented). A within-subject factor regarded whether the manipulation of organizational No. 1:34,8 culture was present or absent when participants completed a task. Thus, in 6 of the 12 tasks, organizational culture was manipulated. In the remaining 6 tasks the manipulation of organizational culture was left out.
Procedure
In economics and psychology classes, the undergraduates were asked to complete a questionnaire about decision making and fairness. Participants were informed that they would be paid SEK 50 (approximately US$5.0) if they agreed to partic ipate and that they were guaranteed anonymity. Those who agreed to participate comple ted the questionnaire individually immediately after class. The different questionnaires were handed out in randomized order.
After contact had been taken with the different companies' staff managers by the experimenter, employees were asked to complete a questionnaire about decision making and fairness. They received the same information regarding payment and anonymity as did the undergraduates. Employees who agreed to participate completed the questionnaire individually at their work place in groups ranging from 5-15 in size.
Completing the questionnaire required about 30 minutes, after which participants were paid and debriefed.
Results
Six participants (2 male and 1 female psychology undergraduates, 1 female business school undergraduate, and 1 male and 1 female employee) failed to respond correctly to all tasks in the questionnaire. They were therefore excluded from the data analyses.
As noted above, participants made a total of 24 choice responses, twelve choices of the fairest and the remaining 12 of the best of the four different allocations (A, B, C, and D). Table 1 displays the mean number of times each of the allocations was chosen as the fairest and as the best allocation, respectively. As may be seen, the equality alternative was chosen most frequently as the fairest allocation, followed by the maximization alternative, the pro-self alternative, and the pro-other alternative. Maximization was chosen most frequently as the best alternative, followed by equality, pro-self, and pro-other. A 2 (choice: fairest vs. best) by 4 (allocation: pro-self vs. proother vs. maximization vs. equality) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded a significant effect of allocation, F(3, 549) = 76.34, p < .001. This effect indicated that equality (M = 11.40) was overall the most chosen allocation, followed by maximization (M = 8.10), pro-self (M = 3.54) and pro-other (M = .96). Bonferronicorrected t-tests at p = .05 revealed that all these mean comparisons were significant. The significant interaction effect between allocation and choice, F(3, 549) = 66.35, p < .001, was also significant. As expected, whereas equality was perceived as the fairest allocation, followed by maximization, pro-self, and pro-other, maximization was perceived as the best allocation, followed by equality, pro-self, and pro-other. Bonferroni-corrected t-tests at p = .05 revealed that all relevant mean comparisons were significant except those between pro-self and equality as the best allocation, equality and maximization as the best allocation, and pro-other as the fairest and pro-other as the best allocation. Thus, among the four allocations, only equality was chosen more often as the fairest allocation than as the best allocation. This difference, between equality as No. 1:34,9 the fairest and equality as the best allocation, is really large and clearly indicates that equality seems to appeal to people's conceptions of fairness, whereas choices of the three other allocations to a higher extent seem to be driven by other motives, such as rationality (maximization) or greed (pro-self). The means of participants' choices of allocations related to experimental group and organizational culture are provided in Table 2 . Means for each of the four allocations were submitted to four parallel 4 (experimental group: received -expected own group vs. received -expected unspecified group vs. known -unknown group vs. own -another group) by 2 (organizational culture: individually oriented vs. collectively oriented) by 2 (culture manipulation: presence vs. absence) by 2 (choice: best alternative vs. fairest alternative) mixed analyses of variance (ANOVAs) 2 with repeated measures on the last two factors. Below, each of the ANOVAs will be reported in turn.
In the ANOVA on the equality allocation, the main effect of the within-subject factor choice was strongly significant, F(1, 176) = 121.82, p < .001. Equality was chosen much more frequently as the fairest alternative (M = 7.59) than as the best alternative (M = 3.81). This effect was modified by experimental group, as revealed by the significant two-way interaction effect between choice and experimental group, F(3, 176) = 4.47, p < .01. As seen in Table 2 , the mean differences between equality as the fairest and as the best alternative were much larger for the groups where social comparisons were made (the known -unknown group and the own -another group) compared to the other two groups (the received -expected own group and the received -expected unspecified group). As further seen in Table 2 , equality was perceived as the fairest allocation only in groups where social comparisons were made. In the other two groups, equality and maximization were perceived as equally fair. The main effect of experimental group was also significant, F(3, 176) = 30.46, p < .001. Bonferronicorrected t-tests at p = .05 revealed that the mean application of equality was a lot higher for the groups where social comparisons were made compared to for the other two groups. Finally, the main effect of the within-subject factor culture manipulation was also significant, F(1, 176) = 17.24, p < .001. When the manipulation of organizational culture was absent, equality was chosen more frequently (M = 3.05) than when the manipulation was present (M = 2.65).
No. 1:34,10 In the ANOVA on the maximization allocation, the main effect of the withinsubject factor choice was strongly significant, F(1, 176) = 44.03, p < .001. Maximization was chosen much more frequently as the best alternative (M = 5.18) than as the fairest (M = 2.92). The main effect of experimental group was also significant, F(3, 176) = 25.74, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected t-tests at p = .05 revealed that the mean application of maximization was a lot higher for the groups where social comparisons were not made (the received -expected unspecified group and the received -expected own group) than for the other two groups (the own -another group and the known -unknown group). As seen in Table 2 , maximization was perceived as the best allocation only in groups where no social comparisons were made. In the other two groups, maximization and equality were perceived as equally good. The two-way interaction effect b etween culture manipulation and experimental group was also significant, F(3, 176) = 3.17, p < .05. For the own -another group, maximization was chosen significantly more often when organizational culture was m anipulated (M = No. 1:34,11 1.38) than when organizational culture was not manipulated (M = 1.02). For the other three groups, there were no such differences.
In the ANOVA on the pro-self allocation, the effect of choice was significant, F(1, 176) = 22.96, p < .001, indicating that pro-self was chosen more frequently as the best (M = 2.39) allocation compared to as the fairest ( M = 1.15). This effect was modified by a significant interaction effect between choice and experimental group, F(3, 176) = 5.88, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected t-tests at p = .05 revealed that the difference in choices of pro-self as the best and as the fairest allocation was significant for the experimental groups where social comparisons were made (the knownunknown group and the own -another group), but not for the other two groups. The interaction effect between choice and organizational culture was also significant, F(1, 176) = 5.09, p < .05. The difference between pro-self as the best or as the fairest allocation was significant for the ind ividually oriented culture (M = 2.57 vs. M = .76) but not for the collectively oriented culture (M = 2.22 vs. M = 1.52). The main effect of the within-subject factor culture manipulation was significant, F(1, 176) = 9.44, p < .01. When the manipulation of organizational culture was present, pro-self was chosen more frequently (M = 1.01) than when the manipulation was absent (M = .76).
Finally, in the ANOVA on the pro-other allocation, the main effect of choice was significant, F(1, 176) = 4.83, p < .05, and indicated that pro-other was chosen more frequently as the best (M = .61) allocation than as the fairest (M = .35). This effect was modified by a significant interaction effect between choice and experimental group, F(3, 176) = 4.76, p < .01. Bonferroni-corrected t-tests at p = .05 revealed that the difference in the choices of pro-other as the best and as the fairest allocation was significant for the received -expected unspecified group, but not for the other three groups. The main effect of experimental group was also significant, F(3, 176) = 5.95, p < .001. Bo nferroni-corrected t-tests at p = .05 revealed that the mean application of proother was lower for the experimental groups where social comparisons were made (the own -another group and the known -unknown group) than for the groups where social comparisons were not made (the received -expected unspecified group and the received -expected own group). The main effect of the within-subject factor culture manipulation was significant, F(1, 176) = 5.13, p < .05. When the manipulation of organizational culture was present, pro-other was chosen more frequently (M = .29) than when the manipulation was absent (M = .19). The significant two-way interaction effect between culture manipulation and experimental group, F(3, 176) = 3.56, p < .05, indicated that this difference was only true for the received -expected unspecified group. This group chose pro-other more often when organizational culture was manip ulated (M = .78) than when organizational culture was not manipulated (M = .38).
Discussion
Equality was overall the most frequently chosen alternative. In experimental groups where social comparisons were made, equality was chosen more often than in the other groups. This can probably be explained by the fact that some kind of relevant (social) comparisons are needed for fairness considerations to be evoked. Equality was certainly perceived as the fairest among the four allocations. Again, in groups where social comparisons were made, the difference between equality as the best and as the fairest allocation was largest. Furthermore, demonstrating that equality is the allocation principle that first comes to mind, it was chosen more frequently when there was no manipulation of organizational culture present in questions compared to as when such a manipulation was present. Thus, what we have demonstrated is that equality will most likely be chosen as the allocation principle when it is a matter of evaluations on the fairness dimension, when social comparisons are made, and when the choice is made in the absence of a manipulation of organizational culture. These results were in accordance with the hypotheses H1a and H2a. However, we did not find any support for hypothesis H3a concerning more frequent choices of equality in a collectively oriented organizational culture. We will return to this later on in this discussion.
The disadvantage of choosing equality as the allocation principle in the present tasks is that it is a collectively irrational choice since the alternative allocation maximization provides more jointly invested money. In fact, both parties in the allocation tasks would be better off should maximization be chosen rather than equality. The results showed that maximization was perceived as the best alternative (although not significantly better than equality) which verifies hypothesis H1b. More importantly, though, maximization was chosen more often as the best than as the fairest allocation. Again, there were effects of the manipulation of social comparison. As expected, participants in experimental groups where social comparisons were not made chose maximization more often than participants in the other groups. This verifies our hypothesis H2b. Thus, since these participants did not make any social comparisons, perhaps they did not feel any conflict between being fair and getting the most.
The two other allocatio ns, pro-self and pro-other, implied very different consequences for groups where social comparisons were made and for groups where no such comparisons were made. For the former groups, the connotations of the labels of the allocations were correct. Thus, pro-self benefited the own or the known group, whereas pro-other benefited the other or the unknown group. For the latter groups, proself allocated more money the present year compared to the following year, whereas pro-other resulted in less money now and a lot more later. This difference between the experimental groups should be expected to affect participants' choices of the fairest and the best allocation, and it certainly did. First, both allocations were chosen more often as the best as compared to as the fairest allocation. However, whereas pro-self was chosen more often as the best than as the fairest for groups where social comparisons were made, pro-other was more frequently chosen as the best than as the fairest for groups where such comparisons were not made. When social comparisons were not made, proother was chosen more often than when comparisons were made. This should come as no surprise since it is probably easier to allocate very different amounts of money between now and later than between two groups of people. Important in our results was the significant support for the prediction that equality is more likely to be considered as the fairest distribution than as the best one. Participants chose to the highest extent equality when they were asked about the fairest allocation, but to a lower extent when they were asked about the best allocation. Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) argued for the legitimacy of equating evaluations of fairness evaluations of preference outcome decisions. Based on arguments in Equity theory, revealing high correlations between preference and fairness in judgments, they concluded that the focus could reasonably be set on the convergence between preference judgments and fairness judgments, rather than on the divergence. Other researchers have in the same way, deliberately or accidentally, treated fairness and preference in outcome evaluations as identical (see van den Bos et al., 1998 , for an overview). However, we believe that the size of this conceptual overlap may vary with conditions, with divergence dominating convergence in some situations. Therefore, it may be wise to keep the two dimensions of evaluations separated. It is interesting to note that participants in experimental groups where no social comparisons were made also chose equality more frequently as the fairest distribution compared to as the best one. Identical results for fairness and preference evaluations should be expected here, since an equal division over time does not have any particular value as fairness. This indeed supports the idea of equality as a decision heuristic with a specific connection to fairness (van den Bos et al., 1998) . Moreover, this is a result in line with previous research where equality has been applied in a quick, non-deliberate, and "blind" fashion (Allison & Messick, 1990; Harris & Joyce, 1980; Messick & Schell, 1992) .
The difference in participants' choices of the best and the fairest allocation may, of course, be due to something else than a real divergence between fairness a nd preference in outcome evaluations. As in the study by Messick and Sentis (1979) , one can speculate that the conceptualization in the questionnaire was the true cause of the effect. Thus, participants may have concluded that different answers to the two dimensions were expected, otherwise the division of the decision task into two tasks would be pointless. However, as these judgment dimensions have been demonstrated to diverge in earlier studies, it is likely that the phenomenon is true also in the present study.
The finding that social comparison increases the probability for an equal distribution to be considered as most suitable is hardly surprising. This result is in line with proposals and experimental results in previous research (Messick & Sentis, 1983; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992 ). An explanation to this phenomenon has to point to some particular causes. For instance, a situation where social comparisons are made calls for other considerations than a situation with no social comparisons calls for. Social comparisons bring into play a norm prescribing an appropriate behavior, and the central norm in resource distribution tasks seems to be equality. A reasonable explanation to the central position of the equality principle, when social comparisons are made, could be its conflict avoiding potential (Messick & Sentis, 1985; Diekman et al., 1997) . Thus, an equal distribution does not surface and evaluate individual differences, for example in social status. Moreover, it is perhaps the peace-promoting potential in equal distributions that explains the use of equality as a heuristic and anchor in social contexts.
For groups where no social comparisons were made, participants considered maximization as the best and fairest allocation. A situation where no social comparisons are made does not evoke a norm of equality, probably because equality here has no social function, for instance, as a mean to signal cooperative intentions and avoid conflicts (Baron, 1994; Sampson, 1975; Shapiro, 1975) . In such situations there is more room for other considerations, such as the goal of maximizing overall outcomes or own outcomes (Deutsch, 1975; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) .
Based on research by Mannix et al. (1995) , we predicted that the manipulation of organizational culture would influence participants' evaluations. Whereas the individually oriented culture was hypothesized to induce participants to make other than equality choices (H3a), the collectively oriented culture was expected to make participants more inclined to choose equality (H3b). However, we found no support for these hypotheses. As a matter of fact, in all analyses, there was only one effect that could be attributed to an individually vs. a collectively oriented culture. The difference between pro-self as t he best and the fairest allocation was significant for the individually oriented culture, but not for the collectively oriented culture. Even though this effect makes sense, our manipulation of organizational culture probably deserves to be questioned. However, since presence vs. absence of the manipulation of both organizational cultures had strong effects in all analyses, the problem does not regard the strength of the manipulation, but trying to illuminate how participants interpreted this manipulation. The manipulation of orga nizational culture had the effect that participants chose equality more in absence of the manipulation and the remaining three allocations more in the presence of the manipulation. These results make sense. In the most neutral situation, without the contextual information from the organizational culture manipulation, the most prevailing allocation principle, equality, is chosen. Deviations from equality demand that something is added to the situation. In this study, it did not matter whether it was information describing an individually or a collectively oriented culture that was added, participants behaved similarly in both cases. The point is that it was merely something that needed to be added for deviations from equality to occur. We think that the major weakness of the study is that we do not know what actually happened when organizational culture was manipulated. It is possible that the same manipulation would result in different and more expected effects if the task was to allocate a bonus increasing the wage between the different parties rather than monetary investments in various employee-development schemes. A bonus would probably more directly make participants attend to differences in inputs and, thereby, make the effect of organizational culture stronger. Perhaps a comparison between an allocation of money invested in employee-development schemes and an allocation of a bonus also would be fruitful.
Future research should further explore definitions and categorizations of eva luation d imensions in outcome evaluations, and under what conditions these dimensions converge and diverge. Further research is also clearly needed on how the adoption of different principles for resource allocation, and as decision heuristics, is influenc ed by the goal of a distribution. As proposed by Deutsch (1975 Deutsch ( , 1985 , the goal of a distribution determines which allocation principle that will be utilized. However, different goals of a distribution have to our knowledge not been explicitly investigated, with the exception of Mannix et al. (1995) . Our attempts to manipulate different goals of a distribution by varying organizational culture did not work. Something happened due to this manipulation, but different goals were most certainly not induced.
Finally, one strength of this study was that we included employees from various organizations and companies as participants. The employees completed the task in their everyday work environment. It is important to note that the employees participating in the study did not behave differently than did the participating undergraduates. This is a promising result since it shows that important questions in organizational contexts can be studied experimentally with undergraduates as participants without serious viola tions of the external validity.
